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Abstract
The Ciba Foundation held the first international, interdisciplinary conference on ethical
and legal issues in transplantation in March 1966. Many of the ethical issues discussed
at that conference remain with us today. Organ procurement and transplantation have
forced the medical community and society at large to ask such fundamental questions
as when are we dead, how can death be declared so that any life‐support measures can
be discontinued? Is it ethical to remove an organ or part of an organ from a living person?
Since there is such a shortage of organ and people on transplant waiting lists die for lack
of an organ, what types of incentives, if any, can be used to increase the organ supply?
Transplant centers face additional ethical issues. How can a limited supply of organs be
fairly allocated to a large number of patients on the waiting list? Are the methods of
putting patients on the waiting list appropriate? Transplant centers are regulated by a
variety of governmental organizations. These organizations may have performance
criteria. Do these performance criteria lead transplant centers to modify which organs
they will accept or which patients they will list? As long as a shortage of organs remains,
these ethical issues are likely to persist.
Keywords: organ procurement, transplantation, organ allocation, brain death, organ
donors, donor registries, international organ trade, transplant waiting list, transplant
regulation
1. Introduction
The first successful organ transplant occurred in 1954 when Dr. Joseph Murray and his team in
Boston transplanted a kidney between identical twin brothers. This was not the first kidney
transplant reported. Dr. Yu Yu Voronoy reported, in 1936, a kidney transplant using a deceased
donor [1]. That and several kidney transplants by Dr. David Hume in the early 1950s, also in
Boston, were not successful. Once the success of transplantation was demonstrated and the
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development of immunosuppressive drugs permitted survival of organs from non‐identical
twins, transplantation rapidly developed. It was not long before the number of people needing
organ transplants outpaced the supply of organs. The disparity between need and supply—
currently in the United States, there are more than 120,000 people awaiting an organ transplant
yet in 2015 there were only just over 30,000 transplants performed—has given rise to the issues
that generate the most ethical discussions in organ procurement and transplantation: (1) How
can we increase the number of both living and deceased organ donors and (2) What is the best
way to allocate (ration) the scarce organs that are available? Twenty people on the waiting list
die every day. Many others are removed from the waiting list because they become too sick while
awaiting an organ. And things may even be worse. Because of the organ shortage and regulatory
oversight of outcomes, transplant centers feel forced to list only the best candidates. Probably,
many others could benefit from an organ transplant. Regulatory oversight of transplantation
and organ donation with its performance requirements may have also contributed to having
fewer organs for transplantation and fewer transplants [2].
The situation is similar in Europe and many other countries with a great disparity between the
number of organ donors and the transplant waiting list. In many other countries, there is no
or only minimal access to organ transplantation. These disparities between the number of
donors and the number of patients on the transplant waiting list gives rise to several potential
ethical issues.
2. Ethical issues in organ donation
2.1. Declaration of death
The first kidney donor was an identical twin. Since that time both living and deceased donor
organs have been used. Initially, living organ donation was limited to blood relatives, because
it was believed that there would be less likelihood or rejection. Since that time, immunosup‐
pression has become so effective that currently virtually any healthy adult can donate. Kidneys
are the most common organ from living donors, but livers, lung, intestine, pancreas, and even
one heart (from an individual with a healthy heart who had it removed as part of a combined
heart–lung transplant) have been performed.
Most organs, however, come from deceased donors. From the beginning, transplant programs
have followed the dead donor rule (DDR): organs should only be recovered from donors who
have died and nothing should be done by transplant or organ recovery programs that would
hasten the death of a donor. There are two ways someone can be pronounced dead: by
neurologic criteria and by circulatory criteria. Donation after neurologic determination of
death (DNDD), also called brain death, occurs when the entire brain including the brain stem
has no detectable function. Some physicians also complement the clinical examination with a
radiologic test that shows no blood flow to the brain. Donation after circulatory determination
of death (DCDD), also referred to donation after cardiac death, occurs when there is no
detectable blood flow in a patient. There is usually a waiting time of 2–5 min to ensure that
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blood flow will not spontaneously reoccur, but some hospitals may use a shorter or longer
waiting period. Both measures for determining death have raised concern.
The first kidney transplants used organs from donors who died from circulatory death [1]. The
concept of neurologic or brain death did not come about until the late 1950s. It arose with the
development of ventilators and intensive care units. There were patients who demonstrated
no clinical brain function but who when maintained with the aid of a ventilator continued to
make urine, have a normal blood pressure, and exhibit many normal physiologic findings. Yet,
these individuals never recovered. That caused physicians, ethicists, philosophers, religious
leaders, and government officials to ask what it really means to be alive or dead. Ultimately,
the concept of neurologic death came about, albeit with much controversy. The concept of
neurologic death changed the criteria for determining death that had been used for thousands
of years. Many physicians and ethicists initially believed it was not ethical to consider neuro‐
logic death. And, the new concept seemed to violate traditional religious concepts of deter‐
mining death.
Some individuals (and some cultures and religions) feel it is wrong to “desecrate” the body of
a dead person by using the body parts for transplantation. But this is a minority view. The
three Abrahamic religions—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—while believing that a dead
body should not be desecrated and should be treated with great respect, all feel that preserving
life through organ transplantation is a higher good. Therefore, recovery of organs for trans‐
plantation is not only permitted, it is to be commended [3].
Virtually, all hospitals are required to have brain death policies. But brain death is not likely
to be pronounced in hospitals without intensive care units or that do not have the ability to
ventilate patients such as rehabilitation hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, and hospitals without
intensive care units. The criteria used to diagnose brain death may vary from state to state.
Some states require only one physician to pronounce brain death, while others require two
physicians to make the diagnosis before death is declared. The definition of brain death is
frequently according to generally accepted medical criteria. One set of criteria has been defined
by the American Academy of Neurology [4].
Ultimately, death determination by neurologic criteria became accepted by most individuals,
including religious experts. The use of organs from DCDD donors was greatly reduced and,
in many places, was eliminated altogether. But growing shortage of organs sparked renewed
interest in DCDD. In the United States, several organ procurement organizations (OPOs) began
to recover organs from these donors, because transplant centers were willing to use them. The
same changes occurred in many other countries as well. But now, the medical and lay com‐
munities had grown so used to organs recovered from DNDD donors that some individuals
objected to using organs from DCDD. They asked whether these donors were really dead. The
United Network for Organ Sharing has published a set of guidelines for recovery of organs
from DCDD donors: Model Elements for Controlled DCD Recovery Protocols (https://
www.unos.org/about/governance/).
The controversy about the ethics of DCDD and DNDD continues to this day. Some people
question whether these donors are truly dead. Rady et al. [5] have reviewed the arguments
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against the validity of neurologic and circulatory death. Objections to neurologic death include
that neurologically dead patients maintain many functions that are coordinated by the brain.
There is often preservation of hypothalamic–pituitary functions. A non‐flat‐line electroence‐
phalogram (EEG) can frequently be obtained. Clinical tests to confirm irreversible cessation of
whole brain and brain stem functions are not completely reliable. But brain‐death determina‐
tion requires that the function of the brain and brain stem should be permanently absent. It
does not require that every cell in the brain be dead. The EEG is unreliable as a determinate of
cerebral activity, since it is sensitive to surrounding electrical activity in the environment.
Objections to using circulatory death determination include the possibility of spontaneous
autoresuscitation or the presence of electrical activity of the heart after 10–15 min of circulatory
arrest, preservation of cerebral activity on EEG after three minutes of circulatory arrest and
that hearts recovered after circulatory arrest can be successfully transplanted. There are other
objections as well. Heparin, an anticoagulant, is usually given to the donor just before death
occurs to prevent clotting in the organs. Heparin could theoretically hasten death if it induces
bleeding into the brain. But since it is given only in the agonal stages of life immediately before
death, it is unlikely to hasten death [6]. If the donor does not die within 60 min after withdrawal
of ventilator support, recovery surgeons usually do not recover the organs, because the
hypotension and lack of oxygen in the blood may have damaged the organs. But with new
preservation techniques, surgeons are waiting up to 120 min and even longer in some cases.
The waiting time after cessation of circulation may not permit sufficient time for the brain to
die.
Because of difficulties some ethicists had with issues involved in assuring those declared dead
by either neurologic or circulatory criteria are really dead, they feel that the dead donor rule
and current methods of declaring death were accompanied by illusions and myths and that
organ recovery may hasten the death of the donor [7–9]. They propose that the DDR should
be abandoned and that a different recovery process should be initiated in patients with severe,
unrecoverable brain injuries. Patients with devastating brain injuries, who would otherwise
be declared brain dead or withdrawn from life support, should have their organs recovered
under general anesthesia as part of the process of withdrawal of life support [5]. In their view,
such recovery would avoid the fiction of declaring death by current methods and permit the
recovery of more organs for transplantation.
2.2. Living donors
Living donors are those individuals who are alive at the beginning of organ donation and are
expected to be alive at the end. They donate one organ or, in some cases, a portion of one organ.
There were approximately 6000 living donors and 9000 deceased donors in the United States
in 2015. Removal of an organ from a living donor is the only operation that is done specifically
to help another person. In fact, living organ donors are chosen because they are healthy. So
living organ donation would seem to violate one of the tenants of medicine: primer non nocere,
first do no harm. Although they cannot be physically better off from the donation, they can
receive psychological benefit from having helped a loved one or another person they may not
even know.
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But living organ donation has the potential to do great harm. First, there is the risk of death
from the operation itself. The risk do dying during donor partial hepatectomy is 0.2%, and the
risk of death during nephrectomy is 0.03% [10, 11]. The mortality risk of donor pancreatectomy
or lung donation has not been determined. Even if the donor survives the operation, long‐term
health outcomes may still be at risk. Some liver donors have had to have liver transplants
themselves because of injury to the bile duct. Most of the long‐term outcome results have been
recorded in kidney donors. Some reports from the United States have reported no adverse
effects on longevity, hypertension renal function, or quality of life with follow‐up as long as
40 years after donation [12]. Other studies, however, report a higher long‐term mortality and
risk of renal failure in kidney donors followed for as long as 44 years [13]. In the United States,
data regarding living kidney and liver donor complications are available in reports of the
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients [14].
Because of the real and potential risks to living organ donors, it is critical that these donors be
carefully selected so as to minimize the short‐term and long‐term risks. In fact, Moore [15]
questioned many years ago whether it was ever morally right and ethically acceptable to injure
one person to help another. A statement by the Live Organ Donor Consensus Group did
provide some guidelines for the evaluation and education of potential living donors [16]. Every
transplant center would like to use only people who are in a state of perfect health and have
normally functioning kidneys. But in an evaluation of the Organ Procurement and Transplant
Network (OPTN) database, Davis and Cooper [17] found that 19.5% of donors were obese, 2%
had a history of hypertension, 3.5% had proteinuria, and 12.2% had no health insurance. So
one concern is whether it is ethically justifiable to use anyone as a living donor who is in less
than perfect health, and, if so, how far can a donor deviate from less than perfect health?
Transplant centers differ greatly in their living donor acceptance criteria. And, the transplant
centers that do accept (as most do) donors with less than perfect health can have different
criteria. What degree of renal dysfunction or hypertension would disqualify a potential
candidate? And on what basis does the center make its decision other than personal feeling of
the selection team. Grams et al. [18] have recently created a model that can help to predict the
risk of eventual renal failure in potential kidney donors. But there will always be some
uncertainty in donor selection. Steiner [19] has pointed out that a “safe” kidney is a delusion.
Centers should not ignore risk quantification, however, imperfect and only do what they are
“comfortable” doing, because they must have defensible reasons for doing what they do. It is
unethical to allow or to deny transplants without good reason.
It is important that potential living donors be fully evaluated and psychologically screened. It
is possible that family members may have pressured someone to donate an organ. If the
transplant team learns that the person does not really want to donate, many transplant centers
will provide a medical excuse that eliminates him as a donor and does not alienate him from
the rest of the family. Yet providing such an “excuse” involves intentional dishonesty by the
transplant center. Is such behavior ever ethical? Even without pressure from family members,
Testa [20] has raised the issue of whether donation can ever be completely voluntary because
of the emotional relationship to a family member who needs an organ, something he has called
“pressured consent.”
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Transplant centers are understandably wary with donors who are not relatives of the recipient
or even have no relationship and who are willing to donate to whomever needs a kidney. The
United States, Canada, and some European countries have recognized these non‐related
donors or altruistic, although their evaluations mat receive special psychological scrutiny.
Guidelines for non‐directed donation have been developed in the United States by the United
Network for Organ Sharing and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons [21].
Because of the unique nature of organ donation, it is important that the surgical team that cares
for the donor be completely separate from the team that cares for the recipient. A consensus
document advocated donor counselors who are independent of the transplant center to
prevent the self‐interest of the transplant center from influencing their judgment. Independent
counselors or donor advocates could prevent the donation if they detected any unacceptable
psychological or medical issues.
However, it is accomplished, donor autonomy must be preserved, and the donor must be fully
informed of potential short‐term and long‐term risks. And yet, transplant centers may vary in
how they present risks. They can cite papers showing that kidney donors live longer or shorter
than non‐donors or that there is no difference. Many donors have made up their minds to
donate before their first visit to the transplant center and are not easily dissuaded by any
discussion about risks. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on every transplant center to present an
honest and factual assessment of donor risks to the best of its ability.
2.3. Financial incentives
One of the most contentious issues is whether incentives—financial or otherwise—should be
used to increase organ donation. In the United States, the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA) has made offering organs for “valuable consideration” illegal. It is illegal to sell organs
in every other country as well except for Iran. Saudi Arabia had an experimental trial of
financial incentives in Riyadh that showed that it could substantially increase organ donation
[22]. Yet, the public in the United States are in favor of some sort of reimbursement [23]. Until
recently, living donors endured expenses such as travel, lodging, meals, and lost wages.
Recently, in the United States, the National Living Donor Assistance Center (www.livingdo‐
norassistance.org) began making help available help for travel and lodging but not for lost
wages.
Those who argue against incentives for organ donation point out that the altruistic system
currently in place has served transplantation well. They maintain that having only altruistic
donors—whether related to the donor or not—has eliminated any sense of coercion. Oppo‐
nents of incentives also emphasize the potential risk to donors and the impact incentives might
have on society’s moral perspective. They cite harms such as coercion, exploitation, under‐
mining dignity, repugnance, and commodification [24]. They talk, however, about unregulated
markets. Placing a price on body parts would lead to commodification of the human body,
something that runs counter to religious teaching and good ethical practice. Other ethically
appropriate methods should be used to increase donation. Furthermore, they argue, offering
payment for organs would offend the sensibilities of many people and might result in fewer
organs donated.
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Those against financial incentives for living donors also claim that it is unethical for medicine
to harm paid kidney donors for the benefit of others and that removing an organ, usually a
kidney, leaves the person in poorer health. If that is so, of course, then removal of an organ for
transplantation from any living donor would also be unethical. In some of these discussions,
the international organ trade becomes conflated with financial incentives for living donors
within a country.
Those in favor of incentives point out that the current system is not functioning adequately as
attested by the long wait for an organ and an increasing number of deaths on the waiting list.
Matas and Hays [25] favor regulated markets and maintain that a government regulated
system would prevent the concerns voiced by opponents. Advocates of incentives claim those
who are against having at least a trial of incentives are willing to see people on the waiting list
die to preserve their own moral purity. Matas and Schnitzler [26] showed that living unrelated
kidney donation would save more than $90,000 (2002 US$) and 3.5 quality‐adjusted life years.
They calculated that offering kidney “vendors” $90,000 would be the break‐even point for
society (because of the high costs of maintenance hemodialysis) and would greatly help
alleviate the waiting list. They are in favor of a regulated system of payment; there would be
no payment outside the regulated system. Matas and Hays [25] argue that with organ donors
remaining steady for the last 10 years and that during those 10 years more than 60,000
candidates have been removed from the waiting list because of death or because they became
too ill. They maintain that those in favor and those opposed to incentives should stop talking
past each other and carry out a well‐designed clinical trial of incentives.
Those in favor of financial incentives add that payment for living kidney donors has eliminated
the waiting list in Iran, the one country in the world that permits payment for kidney donation
(which may not be considered an actual donation). Iran has had a regulated system of payment
for living kidney donors for several years [27, 28]. The government provided payment of a
fixed sum ($3000–$6000) to the donor. In addition, he was exempted from military service and
received 1 year of health insurance [28]. Recently potential donors and recipients have been
allowed to bargain directly and to agree on an amount for the kidney. This system has
eliminated the kidney waiting list. Indeed, the only waiting list is for those who want to be
kidney donors. But kidney donors in Iran tend to be the poorest individuals from the poorest
part of the country. And many of them have had complications and poor health outcomes.
Many, however, look on the Iranian model as exploiting the poor to benefit the rich.
Financial and other incentives have also been proposed as a way to increase the number of
deceased donors. Considerations such as providing payment to the donor’s family, funeral
expenses, donation to a charity, reduction in taxes, provision of health insurance, or preference
on the waiting list should they ever need a transplant are some that have been suggested. All
such incentives are currently illegal everywhere. But recently, the American Society of
Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons held a workshop on
increasing organ donation [29]. They noted that NOTA was recently changed to allow certain
expenses of living donors to be covered. While they believed NOTA did not permit direct
payments for deceased organ donation, it could be interpreted to permit certain expenses of
the donor or family to be covered. In a similar vein, a panel of ethicists, organ procurement
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organization executives, physicians, and surgeons reported in 2002 on financial incentives for
deceased organ donation [30]. The panel addressed whether an ethically acceptable pilot trial
of financial incentives could be proposed for the family to consent to the donation of organs
from a deceased relative. While the panel was unanimously opposed to the exchange of money,
either directly or in the form of a tax incentive, for donation, they believed that it would be
ethical to provide funeral expenses or a charitable contribution that conveyed the appreciation
of society to the family for the donation. And since the panel believed that direct financial
incentives are unethical, there could be no ethical trial of direct financial incentives. However,
with several restrictions there could be a pilot trial of funeral expenses or a charitable contri‐
bution.
There are many arguments against financial incentives. There are also many arguments in
favor of incentives. Many of the arguments against financial incentives have been summarized
by Arnold et al. [30]. Generally, the arguments against financial incentives claim that they
would violate altruism in organ donation and would commercialize organ donation in an
unacceptable way by commodifying donor organs. Such commodification “uses the human
body as a means rather than as an end in itself and brings an unacceptable commerce to the
value of human life” [30]. They point out there is no evidence that financial compensation will
increase organ donation (of course, except for Iran, it has not been tried).
Paying for organ donation would exploit the poor who would be most likely to accept financial
incentives, and the organs would likely go to wealthier patients. But as some have pointed out,
it is the poor who disproportionately are increased on the waiting list but who receive relatively
fewer kidneys than wealthier waitlist candidates, and the poor die at a higher rate on the
waiting list. Perhaps financial incentives, even if the poor are more likely to take advantage of
them, will more likely help poor patients on the waiting list. An incentive system could increase
the likelihood of transplanting organs from donors with diseases that might be transmitted to
the recipient if the donor or family withheld important medical information in order to receive
a financial incentive. Incentives could also influence the family to withdraw care prematurely.
It could blur the line between withdrawing life support and donating organs [30]. It would
also be difficult to standardize a system of payment and might introduce bargaining between
donor families and recovery organizations, especially for organs of better quality and would
place the transplant community on a pathway to paying for organs from live donors [30]. Those
in favor of financial incentives or a “market” that would allow organ sales often offer an
economic analysis of cost‐effectiveness, but that still does not make the buying and selling of
organs ethically acceptable. Furthermore, organ sales would likely not add additional organs
for transplantation. Rather, sales or financial incentives would result in less altruistic donation.
Organ sales would have an adverse effect on society and medical professionalism [30]. It would
be difficult or impossible to set up a truly regulated market as many favoring incentives favor,
because those in need of organs who have the means would likely make additional offers or
go outside the system to make sure they got an organ.
There are also many cogent arguments in favor of financial incentives—if not totally changing
the law, at least conducting a carefully regulated clinical trial [31–35]. The House of Delegates
of the American Medical Association has come out in favor of a pilot study of financial
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incentives for organ donation [36]. Those in favor of incentives or a market in organ sales point
out that with current methods of altruistic organ donation, the number of donors is woefully
inadequate to meet the need of those on organ waiting lists. The lack of organ donors becomes
worse every year in relation to the wait list. And the waiting list may only represent a portion
of those who could potentially benefit from an organ transplant. Transplant centers know there
is a great shortage of organs and may only list their best patients. If many more organs became
available, they might list additional patients who could also benefit from a transplant. The
current altruistic system of obtaining organs has failed to supply enough to save the lives of
thousands who could benefit. Even some of the most vocal opponents of financial incentives
have favored a small reimbursement ($300), which is meant to express appreciation for the
donation and not to provide payment for it [37]. But this “appreciation” is still a payment of
money to the family of an organ donor and would not occur without the donation.
If an important part of a government’s job is to preserve the lives of its citizens, and if financial
incentives would increase the number of organs available, then government is not fulfilling its
obligation. But by denying financial incentives because they would exploit the poor, harm the
donor and commodify the human body, those who are against incentives claim to know what
is best for potential donors and donor families. They can be accused of denying autonomy to
the poor. We ask the poor to do many jobs that we ourselves would not want to do. And they
may be anxious to do them, because they may not be qualified for more skilled, higher paying
jobs. Furthermore, society does allow the sale of eggs, sperm, plasma, and the temporary sale
(rental) of uteri for surrogate births. But those who are against incentives do not claim that all
of these should be outlawed.
The issue of financial incentives either for living or deceased donors is not likely to be settled
anytime soon. It could be that two ethical principles seem to clash. On the one hand, incentives
might be bad for the reasons those opposed give. Yet the other ethical principle of valuing
human life and attempting to preserve it by making more donors available with financial
incentives is also a good argument.
2.4. Donor registries and authorization
Given that the current methods for determining someone is really dead are valid and that we
are not breaching any ethical issues by recovering organs from them (despite that some
continue to disagree—see above), what methods besides financial incentives can be used to
increase the number of donors to help alleviate the great shortage? In 2015 there were 9080
deceased donors in the United States [38]. Yet, according to a study by Klassen et al. [39], there
are more than 37,000 potential donors. No doubt, similar shortfalls in actual versus potential
donors exists everywhere in the world.
In the United States as well as many other places in the world, organ donation has long relied
on opting in; the donor while alive or the family has to grant permission for organs to be
recovered after death. Some have argued that we all have a duty or moral obligation to our
fellow man (or woman) to donate our own organs after death or those of a loved one who is a
potential candidate for donation [40–43]. Menzel [43] maintains “contributing cadaver organs
is not a matter of charitable goodness but instead normally an instance of the moral duty of
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easy rescue.” The main argument has been that donation (some do not even like the word
“donation” because it implies that the person has a choice and is not obligated) after death
does great good, causes no discomfort to the organ donor, and does not cost the donor and the
family anything [40].
With opting in, the transplant community has relied on donor and family altruism to grant
permission for organ recovery. Public education and pleas to stress the need for organs have
been used to increase organ donation. There are many routes to educating the public about
the need including newspaper and magazine articles, television and radio announcements,
billboards, posters and cards in public venues, distribution of donor cards, teaching materials
for schools, talks by health personnel or donor families or living organ donors, and appear‐
ances at health fairs [44]. In recent years, the internet has also been used to promote organ
donation through social media and a variety of web sites. In the United States, Donate Life
Month occurs in April. Many public and private organizations promote organ donation and
educate the public about the need for organs. Education of key hospital is also needed so the
OPO is called every time there is a potential donor.
People can sign to be on a donor registry at a driver’s license facility or through the internet.
Information is provided at the driver’s license facility and on registry sites on the internet that
are inform the public about what agreeing to be an organ donor entails. Registration only
covers brain dead donors. For donation after circulatory death, the family must still give its
agreement.
In recent years, donor registries have registered individuals during life who have indicated
their willingness to be organ donors when they die. And the transplant community has gone
to great effort to increase the number of people who sign up for donor registries, either when
renewing their driver licenses, signing organ donor cards, or registering on the internet. In
many states, signing organ donor cards or being on state registries enables organs to be
recovered after death even if the family objects. Israel gives individuals who have agreed to
be an organ donor if they die preference on the waiting list if they should ever need a kidney
transplant [45].
Because large organ shortages continue with opting in systems, some countries have adopted
other organ recovery strategies and still others have been proposed. These include opting out,
mandated choice, and financial incentives.
The United States and most other countries have long had an opting in form of consent whereby
the donor while alive or the family of a deceased potential donor must give consent for organ
donation before organs can be recovered. But many countries have adopted an opting out (also
commonly called presumed consent) strategy to increase organ donation. Veatch and Pitt [46]
have pointed out that none of the laws in the countries that permit organ recovery without
explicit consent of the donor while alive or family actually mentions the words presumed
consent. Among countries with versions of opting out laws are Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy,
Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. Cyprus, Hungary, Singapore, and Syria also have laws
authorizing organ recovery without claiming to have presumed consent [46]. In these coun‐
tries, organ recovery can occur following death unless the family specifically objects or the
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donor while alive has indicated while alive that he does not want recovery to occur, but organ
recovery agencies do not have to ask permission. While presumed consent still permits families
to object to donation and to prevent it from occurring, the onus is on them to take the initial
steps. Presumed consent has led to an increase in organ recovery in many countries that have
adopted it. Spain is the most successful country in the world in organ recovery. In addition to
presumed consent, Spanish hospitals have physicians who are responsible for identifying
organ donors and promoting donation in the intensive care units [47].
There are ethical and practical issues in adopting opting out or presumed consent. It is counter
to current practice in the United States and requires new legislation. Some claim it would be
more humane than opting in, because organ procurement coordinators would not have to
discuss organ donation at a difficult time for the family. But it may overlook the family’s
knowledge of the individual’s preferences and may increase distrust of the medical community
with concern that death may be declared prematurely [44]. Presumed consent would also cloud
who has control over a deceased person’s body (there is no ownership rights to a dead body).
Veatch and Pitt [46] prefer the term “routine salvaging” to presumed consent as being more
honest, because that term refers to a policy that is not grounded in presumption, but rather in
a belief that society has a right to recover organs without individual consent. In other words,
Can the state maintain that one of its important functions is to preserve the lives of its citizens
and therefore can salvage (some would say confiscate) dead bodies for the purpose of organ
recovery?
Mandated choice would require every adult to decide and record whether they wish to be an
organ donor when they die. No country currently has a policy of mandated choice. It would
eliminate the need to obtain consent. It would relieve the family of what might be an agonizing
decision and prevent family disagreement. Because the person made a decision about their
body before death, many of the objections of presumed consent would be obviated. Mandated
choice has been criticized as being insensitive to families and forcing individuals to confront
their own death. The American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
feels mandated choice is not coercive because individuals are free to say no [48]. And by
requiring individuals to decide on donation, it promotes autonomy.
2.5. The international organ trade
Many people, usually from First World countries and wealthy individuals from other countries
among which are European nations, the United States, Japan, and the Gulf States, travel to
Second and Third World countries where they can purchase kidneys and receive transplants.
Also called transplant tourism, this travel is due to the insufficient number of organs in their
home countries. In 2007, the World Health Organization estimated that of the 60,000 kidney
transplants performed annually around the globe, 5–10% were due to the international trade
in organs [49]. In 2011, the Institute, Global Financial Integrity, ranked the international organ
trade in the top 10 of the world’s most profitable crimes, with an estimated profit of $614–
$1200 million per year [49]. The European Union has funded the formerly Human Organ
Trafficking for Transplantation (HOTT) project, which addresses “trafficking in human beings
for the purpose of organ removal” [49]. With the primary concern being exploitation of the
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poor, virtually every country has made the international organ trade illegal and numerous
international organizations have written position papers condemning it including the Trans‐
plantation Society, the Council of Europe, the World Medical Association, the Bellagio Task
Force, and the Declaration of Istanbul (by the Transplantation Society and International Society
of Nephrology, the World Health Organization, and the International Congress on Transplan‐
tation in developing countries) [50–52]. But transplant tourism continues to occur.
In addition to the ethical arguments against paying for organs given above, the international
organ trade is also condemned because of the types of people willing to sell organs and the
negative effects kidney removal has on the organ sellers. It is not ethical to take advantage of
poor organ sellers for the advantage of the rich. People willing to sell their kidneys are poor
and live in the poorest parts of the poorest countries. Their desperate situations mean that the
choice to sell a kidney is not free or autonomous [42]. The international organ trade results in
transferring kidneys from the poor to the wealthy who can afford to pay for transplants and
the travel to countries where they can receive a transplant. These desperate kidney sellers may
not provide a complete medical history either from ignorance or from fear of being rejected as
a donor, which can further lead to adverse effects on their own health or to transfer of disease
to the kidney recipient. After the kidney removal, the sellers have numerous problems
including hypertension, kidney insufficiency, infection, and other medical problems [52]. They
have limited, if any, access to medical care should they need it. They frequently become
unemployable, because they are usually unskilled and not able to sustain heavy agricultural
or construction work. Furthermore, they may become social outcasts and are alienated from
their families, excommunicated from their churches, and excluded from marriage.
But there are opposing viewpoints that argue in favor of allowing individuals in any country
to sell their kidney to willing buyers. Bakdash [52] who himself grew up in poverty says that
“poverty itself is a kind of coercion. None of the decisions any poor person makes is made on
the basis of free will—instead, these decisions are all dependent on the person’s dire financial
situation.” He points out that the desperately poor may have to choose between selling a kidney
and letting their children starve. People may be willing to sell their kidneys because they want
a chance at a better life.
All the condemnations by the numerous health and transplant organizations have not stopped
the buying and selling of organs in Second and Third world countries. While those who oppose
buying and selling of organs point out that poor organ sellers frequently get poor medical care,
Bakdash [52] points out that if medical care for these individuals were taken out of the shadows
and brought into the open through a regulated market, they would be able to avail themselves
of better medical care. Radcliffe‐Richards and colleagues [53] have pointed out that there is
much greater opportunity for “exploitation and abuse when the supply of desperately wanted
goods is made illegal.”
Others maintain that prohibiting organ sales takes away the potential seller’s autonomy and
is paternalistic. They believe that the wealthy who write the rules and regulations find it
convenient to tell the poor what is good for them and to deny them the opportunity to possibly
improve their situation.
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2.6. Ethical issues in transplantation and organ allocation
As long as there is a shortage of organs for transplantation, there will be a requirement that
those organs be offered to patients on the waiting list in an ethical manner. The allocation
system should be “fair.” The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network/United Network
for Organ Sharing (OPTN/UNOS) Ethics Committee adopted and updated in 2015 a white
paper, “Ethical Principles in the Allocation of Human Organs” [54]. These principles provide
a framework for regulations for the organ allocation policies.
The three ethical principles that govern organ allocations policies are as follows: “utility (doing
good and avoiding harm), justice, and respect for persons” [54]. Utility “refers to the maximi‐
zation of net benefit to the community (taking into account both the amount of benefit and
harm and the probability of such benefit and harm)”. Justice refers to the fair distribution of
benefits. And respect for persons refers to telling the truth, keeping commitments, and,
especially, respect for autonomy. The OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee realized that recom‐
mendations are for policy in a pluralistic society in which individuals may hold conflicting,
yet reasonable, positions on organ allocation.
The three ethical principles individually may lead to policies that conflict with each other.
Therefore, the principles have to be balanced in order to achieve an equitable outcome. Utility
should lead to maximizing the net benefit for the community, thus incorporating the ethics
principles of beneficence (doing good) and non‐maleficence (not doing harm). In maximizing
utility factors such as patient survival, graft survival, quality of life, alternative treatments, and
age can be taken into account [55]. Social aspects such as social worth, social status, occupation,
race, and so forth should not be considered in formulating policy.
The OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee uses justice to refer to “fairness in the pattern of distri‐
bution of the benefits and burdens of an organ procurement and allocation program” [54]. It
does not mean treating all patients the same but does “require giving equal respect and concern
to each patient”. Factors to be considered in the application of justice include medical urgency,
likelihood of finding a transplant in the future, wait list time, first versus repeat transplant,
age, and geography. Autonomy requires treating people as ends in themselves, not only as
means. But sometimes, respect for autonomy conflicts with other ethical principles, and
sometimes, autonomy must be respected and other times, it must give way.
These ethical principles may lead to conflict when it comes to formulating actual policies. The
OPTN/UNOS white paper also provides guidelines for resolution among principles. As a
compromise when ethical principles conflict, an attempt should be made to formulate policies
that give each of the conflicting principles equal weights rather than ranking them in some
order.
Even though the white paper serves as an important set of guidelines, there have been strong
disagreements about how to put them into practice. The OPTN has periodically changed the
allocation scheme for every organ, always trying to achieve a new policy that would be more
fair and better reflect the ethical principles. Yet as long as the organ shortage remains (which
it will for the foreseeable future), any change in policy that increases organs to one group of
patients must take away from another group. The dilemma of selecting ethical allocation
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schemes was shown in recent years in the United States with the proposed revision kidney
allocation using projected survival after transplantation and kidney quality and in 2011 to use
kidney quality and allocating 20% of kidneys to patients with the highest estimated post‐
transplant survival. The current system, based primarily on waiting time, is patient centered.
The proposed system which recognizes the value society places on the life‐extending potential
of a scarce resource is resource centered. Proponents and opponents of this proposed allocation
scheme use practical and ethical arguments to support their positions. For instance, one reason
proponents are in favor is because it would lead to more life years in recipients and would
direct more kidneys to younger patients who have not had the opportunity to live as long as
older individuals on the waiting list, while opponents object because the new allocation scheme
would result in age discrimination.
Other alterations to the allocation of kidneys to favor the young by giving them primary access
to kidneys from younger donors that are regarded to be better quality than kidneys from older
donors is disadvantages to older patients on the waiting list. Allocation schemes that favor
multiorgan transplants over single organ transplants disadvantage patients who would
otherwise have received the second organ. Directing kidneys preferentially to highly sensitized
patients with high panel reactive antibody may be good for this set of difficult‐to‐transplant
patients but directs kidneys away from patients with lower antibody levels. Directing organs
to maximize patient survival may lead to one set of allocation schemes whereas allocating
organs to the sickest (and thus preventing imminent deaths of other patients) could favor a
different allocation scheme. All these allocation schemes by favoring one subset of patients
may be good for society overall, but they necessarily discriminate against other groups of
patients on the waiting list. Should patients who have had one transplant that has failed be
given a second transplant when so many patients have not even had a single transplant?
As Chumfong and colleagues [55] said, “all allocation systems ought to achieve a version of
distributive justice for the good of society. The fundamental issue at odds in the current and
new allocation systems is what exactly the good of society is.”
While the current discussion is mainly from the perspective of the ethical issues involved in
kidney allocation in the United States, these same issues apply to virtually every other country
and to other organs as well. As long as the shortage of organs continues, good, well‐meaning
people will disagree on precisely what form the best and most ethical policy is. This disagree‐
ment may stem from their unique situations in life and work, their backgrounds, culture,
perhaps even their genetics. What is interesting, although subject for a different discussion, is
just why people who agree on ethical principles may disagree vehemently on their actual
application. Nevertheless, the allocation system in the United States is always a work in
progress as UNOS constantly strives for more fairness for patients, better outcomes, and
minimizing wasteful discarding of transplantable organs.
2.7. The waiting list
Currently, individual transplant centers determine which patients are placed on the waiting
list. There may be guidelines, but there are few established criteria. The actions of individual
transplant centers are important, because who is on the list affects who gets transplanted and
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therefore how organs are allocated. Thus, important ethical considerations can affect allocation
before an organ even becomes available.
Both medical and non‐medical criteria are used in deciding whether a potential candidate
should be placed on the waiting list. Each organ may have its own set of criteria. For instance,
to be placed on the waiting list for a kidney transplant, patients frequently have their renal
function and bladder function evaluated. Some patients may also undergo cardiac evaluation,
assessment of immune status against certain infectious agents, etc. Transplant centers fre‐
quently differ in how they use the results of medical testing in their decision to list patients.
Patients may be turned down at one transplant center but accepted at another, leading some
patients to “shop” for a transplant center willing to list them. Differences in medical criteria
between transplant centers may not pose ethical issues; they may just represent honest
disagreements between centers [56].
Transplant centers also evaluate patients using behavioral and other non‐medical criteria.
Virtually, everyone agrees that group characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, race, etc. should
not enter into the decision of whether to place a patient on the waiting list. The UNOS Ethics
Committee has recently addressed the non‐medical considerations in assessment for trans‐
plant candidacy [54]. While age or co‐morbidity should not arbitrarily be used as criteria for
listing patients, life expectancy with a functioning graft using factors such as age, co‐morbid‐
ities, and other factors can used if it is significantly shorter than the expected life span of the
transplanted organ. But these decisions based on age and comorbidities should be made on
an individual patient basis.
Transplant programs frequently refuse to list patients who exhibit some behavioral character‐
istics such as smoking, addiction, drug abuse, history of noncompliance with a medical
regimen, or mental disability. Caplan [57] has written that such exclusion of categories of
patients such as these increases doubt about the equitable allocation of organs. But transplant
centers that do use these categories to exclude patients from listing justify their actions on the
basis of being good stewards of precious organs. It would be a tragedy to transplant an organ
and have it rejected because the patient did not take her antirejection medications because of
behavior characteristics that were known before listing. Every transplant center has had
experience with patients losing organs for these reasons. If this type of loss occurs, it means
the recipient had an operation for no benefit (and likely would need a second operation to
remove the organ or a second transplant) and another patient on the waiting list was denied
access to that organ. Furthermore, the donor family who often are in contact with the recipient
of their loved one’s organs may experience a second loss if the transplanted organ is lost. This
exclusion is especially true if a behavior contributed to organ failure such as alcohol con‐
sumption and liver failure or smoking and lung failure. These transplant centers require
patients to quit using alcohol and smoking, although they may disagree how long abstinence
is required before listing. And some centers permanently remove such patients from the
waiting list should they relapse. Caplan [57] might think that is too harsh and would lead to
doubt about the allocation of organs (since allocation begins with who is put on the waiting
list). But most transplant centers believe such exclusions are good medical practice and the
correct ethical decision.
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Behaviors that may exclude patients from listing may not be permanent. The ethical issue
for transplant centers is whether patients can recover from what they consider to be
unacceptable behaviors and what criteria the patients must demonstrate to show they are
now an acceptable candidate. An issue for the UNOS Ethics Committee is whether non‐
compliance behavior is serious, consistent, and documented in current or previous treatment
[54].
2.8. Transplant volume and regulation
Other ethical issues for transplant centers arise at the juncture maintaining quality, increasing
numbers of transplants, minimizing costs for the hospital, and satisfying regulators [58].
Transplant physicians and surgeons generally want to perform as many transplants as they
can in order to serve their patients on the waiting list and to increase the status of the program.
This may cause them to place patients on the waiting list who are far from ideal candidates.
And because many transplant candidates have other health issues in addition to the primary
organ failure, the issue becomes how far can one deviate from an ideal candidate and not pose
too great a risk both for the patient and the transplant program. With too great a set of
qualifications to be on the waiting list, the program may deny access for many qualified
candidates. But too few qualifications also are unfair to the patient because of the excessive
risk, it may impose from transplantation. There are no firm guidelines and programs differ in
their qualifications for listing.
Similarly, transplant programs must accept organs that have a high certainty of function when
transplanted. In order to increase the number of transplants, it is tempting for transplant
centers to accept organs that are less than ideal. But how far can an organ depart from ideal
and still be ethically acceptable to transplant? Here, again there are no firm guidelines and
transplant centers differ in organ acceptance criteria. Patients are supposed to be informed if
the organ is less than ideal, but most patients have limited ability to appreciate the many
subtleties that go into the decision to accept an organ. But it is more likely that transplant
centers turn down organs that can be transplanted. Many organs are discarded that are suitable
for transplantation [59].
Listing patients for transplantation and accepting organs are influenced not only by the
patient’s need for a transplant. Also important, although not frequently mentioned, are other
important influences that affect these decisions. Hospital administrators want transplant
programs that are successful and do not operate at a loss. They want a high‐quality program
that performs many transplants. They may pressure transplant physicians and surgeons to
minimize hospital stay to shorter than they think is best for the patient, use less expensive
medications, and to transplant only well‐insured patients, and not place higher risk patients
on the waiting list because they usually have much higher costs. They may not express these
feelings overtly, but the transplant physicians and surgeons usually get the message very
clearly.
Regulators also play a role in creating ethical dilemmas. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) in the United States, which regulates and funds much of transplan‐
tation, in 2006, published the Conditions of Participation for Transplant Centers [60]. The
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Conditions of Participation for Organ Procurement Organizations were published a year later
[61]. The conditions of participation (COP) for transplant centers had performance criteria with
expected outcomes. Transplant centers could be closed if their outcomes were below expected
levels. This threat may have caused transplant centers to become more conservative in their
acceptance of organs, because no center wanted to be closed. Whereas the number of trans‐
plants increased every year before the COP, they stabilized for several years and there was no
increase [62]. Similarly, publication of the COP for OPOs led to a stabilization of the number
of deceased donors recovered, although it too had been increasing in previous years. Like
transplant centers, no OPO wanted to be closed if it could not meet the performance measures.
By limiting the number of transplants, acceptance of organs, and limiting the number of
deceased donors they recovered, both transplant centers and OPOs sought to continue their
existence. Thus, regulation may have an adverse effect on some aspects of transplantation.
Another issue for regulators is to design performance measures that do not stifle innovation
and experimentation. How can transplant centers that want to try new, unproven techniques
or therapies not be punished if these innovations turn out to be unsuccessful and lead to worse
outcomes? Because of the negative feedback about COPs from transplant centers and OPOs
and the adverse effect, the COPs may be having on outcomes and the number of transplants
performed; CMS is currently engaging transplant centers and OPOs to revise performance
metrics. Hopefully, these revised metrics will remove disincentives and will result in more
patients being transplanted and better outcomes.
3. Conclusion
The Ciba Foundation held the first international, interdisciplinary conference on ethical and
legal issues in transplantation in March 1966. Some of the issues discussed included the
following: definition of death, removal of kidneys from moribund but not yet dead patients,
use of living kidney donors, ensuring consent for kidney removal in living donors is voluntary,
organ markets, and economic barriers to transplantation [63]. After 50 years, many of these
ethical issues remain. How best to organize organ transplantation, to increase the number of
organ donors, allocate organs, and regulate transplantation and organ donation are constantly
works in progress. Changes try to improve patient access, improve transplantation outcomes,
and increase the number of transplants. As long as the shortage of organs continues, as it will
for the foreseeable future, there will be ethical challenges to confront. Any changes may solve
some ethical problems but are likely to introduce new ones.
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